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ABSTRACT
Cohen, Daniel

Boudicca’s Rebellion Against the
Roman Empire in 60 AD

This paper examines the rebellion of Boudicca, the queen of the Iceni tribe,
during the Roman Empire’s occupation of Britannia in 60 AD. The study shows that had
Boudicca not changed her winning strategy in one key battle, she could have forced the
Roman Empire to withdraw their presence from Britannia, at least until it was prudent
to invade again. This paper analyzes the few extant historical accounts available on
Boudicca, namely those of the Roman historians Tacitus and Cassius Dio, to explore the
effectiveness of tactics on both sides of the rebellion. The sources reveal that Boudicca
enjoyed initial success against the Roman army, which she greatly outnumbered, due to
the Roman authority underestimating both her ability in combat and the consequences
a defeat would bring. However, she soon became overconfident in her actions, allowing
her to fall into a trap where her numbers and other advantages she previously enjoyed
no longer mattered.
The study will also argue that in the aftermath of the rebellion, Emperor Nero
tasked the current Roman governor of Britannia to begin reprisals against most of
Britannia and then create a scapegoat out of him by recalling him from his position. This
was carefully done to show Britons that the Romans could be harsh but they could be
kind as well, which created a sense of loyalty to the Roman Empire that survived for
centuries. There would never again be another British rebellion against the Roman
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presence in Britannia, ensuring cooperation between the two civilizations. Through
Rome’s helping hand, ensured by Britons no longer seeking independence through
violent insurrections, strides were made to connect the area with the greater world. The
start of urbanization and the founding of strategically-planned trading cities, such as
Londinium, had a profound effect on Britannia and it could not have become so
powerful in the future without these developments. In addition, the unification of tribes
ended common conflicts and the stability achieved through this allowed Britons to focus
more on other pursuits and modern trades. Boudicca’s rebellion would therefore have
had a great effect on the course of modern history if she were to successfully drive the
Romans out and cause a regression back to the original customs and traditions. The fact
that the Roman Empire was able to stop her and pacify Britannia so they would no
longer reject their authority therefore is important to the study of any modern history
through the powerful influence that Britannia later had on global affairs.
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Preface
In the first century BC, when Julius Caesar first made contact with Britannia, the
region was home to near thirty major tribes in total. These tribes did not live in harmony
however, and battles between warring communities were not uncommon. Their
political system was largely undeveloped and not as sophisticated as the governments
of the Mediterranean civilizations or even as the tribal system of their Gallic neighbors.
By the mid-first century AD, however, when Emperor Claudius of the Roman Empire
began the conquest of Britannia, it was all about to change. The Romans held control of
the region for over 360 years until 410 AD, when they decided to withdraw their
presence due to problems both at home and mounting pressure from outside forces,
but during this time they influenced Britannia tremendously. While there is a large gap
in time between the Roman withdrawal from Britannia and British Empire emergence as
a global power, serious strides were made during the Roman occupation and tools to
success were developed without which the creation of an empire would most likely not
have occurred.
Exploring the roots of the British Empire is important to understanding not only
how they were able to become such a globally-dominating power, but is also important
for historians to further the study of British history. Boudicca is not a very well-known
woman, and was actually forgotten for millennia, even though she was an integral part
of why modern Britain exists in its current state. Not only did she alert the Roman
Empire to how poorly they were treating Britannia as a wakeup call that they may lose
control, but the story of one woman successfully challenging the Roman Empire is rare.
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The Roman development of Britannia was a necessity for the creation of their
later empire. It brought Britannia into communication with the greater world and
brought unknown technology to the region which in turn created infrastructure and
stability. This stability was important since Britannia, previously a war-torn region, could
now achieve greater productivity and quality of life through peace. In addition, Rome
started the process of urbanization, which was previously unknown to the tribal people
and was necessary to help create Britannia as a trading power. The founding of planned
cities as trading hubs to attract foreign merchants was quickly undertaken by the
Romans. Both Verulamium and Londinium, which Boudicca targeted, were founded as
trading cities and Londinium quickly proved to become Britannia’s largest and most
profitable city. The urbanization process also brought the practice of government to the
attention of the Britons, and they developed their political system with the help of
Rome. Local governments arose to help citizens and the need to fund them through
local taxes encouraged Britons to actively learn skills that would further their own
development. Although there was much more work to be done until the Britons were
able to handle a globally-spanning empire, the giant leap forward that Rome brought
upon them was necessary to keep them up to speed with the modern world.
When Claudius initiated the conquest in 43 AD, the Roman Empire was in its
infancy and was in the process of imperial expansion. The empire was not even a
century old yet and Claudius was only the fourth ever emperor. They were not yet close
to the height of their power although they already did control many provinces outside
of Italy from the Roman Republic. Nevertheless, Rome had been in the process of an
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aggressive expansion and Britannia was next on the list. After the conquest, they
treated the natives poorly and cared more about expanding their borders than about
British concerns. As a result, strong anti-Roman feelings quickly brewed among the
British tribes, particularly the Iceni and Trinovantes in south-western England. After the
king of the Iceni died in 59 AD, he attempted to leave his wife, Boudicca, as the
successor to his rule but Rome denied this request and humiliated her in the process.
This put Boudicca in a special position to unify all those who felt unfairly treated by
Rome. Although previously tribes did not band together, Boudicca was able to unite
both the Iceni and the Trinovantes in 60 AD and quickly created an army consisting of
150,000 people, which quickly increased to 230,000. She razed three cities and by
defeating one of the four Roman legions in Britannia, she proved that Britons stood a
chance against Roman might. However, she ended up losing and her army was defeated
at the Battle of Watling Street not soon after, but it is important to note that she stood a
chance of pushing the Romans out of Britannia.
At this time period, there were other rebellions against Roman occupation and
battles to stop Roman conquests. One of these rebellions was the first Jewish-Roman
War that took place in Judaea in 66 AD. Similarly, to the situation in Britannia, there was
a lot of tension between the Jews and the Romans since they had annexed the region
sixty years prior, and the Jews wanted to rebel against the Empire and push the Romans
out. This war was one of three Jewish rebellions against the Roman Empire. The Roman
Empire wanted to control Judaea not necessarily because of the riches of the land, but
because its trade location to the wealthier Egypt. This is in contrast to the Roman
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interest in Britannia, which was in the rich resources that lay in the land and the strong
pool of manpower available in the large population. The Roman Empire did not need the
people of Judaea as much as they needed the people of Britannia and so their goals in
each region were different.
The Romans were not very interested in keeping Britannia if it brought more
trouble than it was worth, but this was not the case with Judaea, as evidenced by the
continuation of the Jewish diaspora under Roman law. After the war, there were
permanent punitive measures taken against the Jews, such as the destruction of
Jerusalem and the Second Temple. In contrast to Judaea, Rome took advantage of the
rebellion to show that, while they could punish and make life harder for the Britons,
they were also capable of helping them and improving their lives, which is something
that they did not offer to Judaea. In addition, the First Jewish-Roman War did not stand
nearly as much of a chance of pushing the Roman Empire out of their land as Boudicca
did.

5

Introduction
Modern history has forever been influenced by the wide-reaching power of the
United Kingdom; from its medieval history to its more modern history as a vast imperial
power, it has made its mark on the world. However, in Britain’s earlier development, it
was nothing more than a collection of divided barbarian tribes. During this time, in the
first century BC and AD, the Roman Empire was intrigued by Britannia’s possible wealth
and attempted an invasion of the isles. Although it took Rome many years, and they
were not fully able to annex the entire region, they conquered most of England and held
it for nearly four hundred years, setting the stage for Britain to develop into a worldchanging superpower. But this was almost not to be, due to the actions of Boudicca, one
British tribe’s disgruntled queen. Boudicca led a large rebellion against the Roman
Empire in 60 AD, only seventeen years after the Roman invasion, whilst Rome was still in
the process of solidifying its rule. Her army was vast and enjoyed initial success, until the
Romans finally took the threat seriously and were able to outmaneuver her. Although
the rebellion was short-lived, it was the largest that Rome had ever faced from Britain in
its entire occupation of the territory, and it could have conceivably ended the Roman
hold over Britannia if Boudicca had been more careful in her strategy. In fact, Boudicca
had been so ruthless and successful in the initial stages of her rebellion, that Emperor
Nero had even thought of pulling out from Britannia as it was not worth the trouble.1
The existing literature on Early Romano-British history is dominated by a small
group of authors, but this is no surprise when considering the primary sources available
1

Gaius Suetonius Tranquilus, “Nero,” in De Vita Caesorum, trans. J.C. Rolfe (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1913).
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for this time period. Although there are many ancient sources detailing the full history
of the Roman conquest of Britain, there are only two surviving sources available that
discuss Boudicca’s rebellion and its immediate aftermath. These sources are written by
Tacitus, who lived during the aftermath of the rebellion and whose father-in-law was a
Roman soldier in Britain, and Cassius Dio, who would not be born for another 95 years
after the rebellion and had to collect most of his information second-hand. In addition,
there are elements of Cassius Dio’s history that directly conflict with what Tacitus
recorded but since Tacitus was more of a contemporary of Boudicca, he likely was more
accurate.
Because of the small amount of primary source material, most of the existing
literature has had to combine recent archaeological finds with written history to
reconstruct a timeline of Roman Britain and the rebellion. Although this make for a
smaller circle of secondary literature, because this material has been covered
extensively already, this thesis will contribute to the field by examining the mistakes
that Boudicca made in her campaign, and exploring how the Romans were able to
obtain British allegiance afterwards. It will attempt to demonstrate that had Boudicca
acted more cautious in keeping the strength of her original strategy, as suited to her
army, her tactics could have defeated the Romans and run them out of Britain at least
temporarily. It will also show that in the aftermath of the rebellion, the Roman Empire
created ingeniously created a scapegoat to which the Britons accepted, leading to their
absolute loyalty for the rest of the occupation.
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After the rebellion had been crushed, the Roman Empire devised a plan to use
this rare opportunity to strengthen their hold over Britain. They showed the Britons that
while they could be feared and intimidate the Britons into compliance, they could also
work with them to reach a mutual benefit. This policy is interesting because it
eventually converted an anti-imperialist region with a long history of strife and conflict
into loyal subjects. The Roman strategy was successful because, aside from a small
rebellion several years later in Northern England, there was never again any recorded
attempts of British rebellions in hopes of throwing out the Roman Empire in nearly 350
years, all the way to the Roman withdrawal of Britannia in 410 AD.
Boudicca’s rebellion occurred in a large part because of the way that Rome was
treating its subjects. What remains important from this rebellion, however, is that
Boudicca had stood a chance to push Roman forces out of Britain, changing the flow of
history as we currently know it. Because of the importance that Rome played in
England’s development as a global power, this rebellion is important to examine as its
implications were vast. Had Nero decided to pull out of Britain, perhaps England might
not have become the global imperialist power that ended up shaping modern history. In
addition, through Rome’s deliberate use of a scapegoat, Britain eventually became a
loyal subject of Roman authority and kept their blend of Roman and British culture. The
progress made in modernizing Britain was not destroyed afterwards and so they were
able to continue their course as a developing power and not regress into their previous
tribal conflicts.
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Because the British have had a large influence on modern history, the root of this
influence has had a wide range of scholarly work written. Roman Britain has been
covered by historians on all available areas and Boudicca’s Rebellion is no exception.
Graham Webster, a British archaeologist widely considered to be one of the greatest
Romano-British archaeologists, writes that a key reason that the Roman army was so
effective was because, living in a war torn region, “tacticians were always concerned
with methods of dealing with new threats.”2 Webster also cites the Roman army’s strict
disciplinary system which ensured that the officers, when they realized they had to
switch to a new tactic, could easily command a group of soldiers to manoeuver into
intricate and difficult formations on the battlefield.3 This, he claims, was in contrast to
the Britons who, “once the battle was engaged… were committed to a predetermined
course of actions.”4 T.W. Potter shares this view of an innovating Roman army, writing
that “the Roman authorities were constantly evolving new methods of warfare.”5 Peter
Salway also agrees with this assessment, writing that the British’s lack of daily training
and discipline that standing armies, such as Rome’s, underwent “meant that the Britons
could not carry out complicated maneuvers in battle. Roman troops could… be detached
and sent to different parts of the field as required… a British commander… had little
chance of carrying out alternatives if the needs of the moment seemed to demand

2

Graham Webster, Boudica: The British Revolt Against Rome AD 60 (London: Routledge, 1993), 24.
Ibid, 25.
4
Ibid.
5
T.W. Potter, Roman Britain (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 33.
3
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them.”6 These tactics, all three agree, were a strong advantage against the British
forces, who they claim had little chance to rival their might.
In contrast, R. G. Collingwood and J. N. L. Myres claim that British forces were
more than ready to face the methodical and modern Roman maneuvers, and they use
the Battle of Medway as their evidence. This battle was fought in 43 AD during the
Roman invasion under Claudius and lasted two days, which was rare for ancient warfare.
They write that this “reflects credit both on British leadership and on the steadiness of
British troops that, though caught unawares and confronted with a simultaneous cavalry
attack and flanking movement, the Britons were victors in the first day’s fighting.”7
Although Rome eventually won the battle, they use this example to show that British
forces were not easily overrun and could put up a good fight against Rome. This
strength in the face of both superior cavalry and modern tactics is not mentioned as an
achievement by other scholars. Collingwood is keen to point out that the Britons were
not a simple and unmatched force. He writes that “the Britons whom the armies of
Claudius conquered were by no means savages.”8 He goes on to claim that the
difference in culture between the British and the Romans is not nearly as vast as “there
is between the natives of an African protectorate and their European rulers [during the
modern imperialist period].”9 In other words, the difference in culture and access to
technologies was not as wide as is commonly believed. This does contrast with other
scholars, such as Graham, who in his description of British forces, paint an old-fashioned
6

Peter Salway, Roman Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 77.
R.G. Collingwood and J.N.L. Myres, Roman Britain and the English Settlements (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1936), 83.
8
R.G. Collingwood, Roman Britain (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1994), 6.
9
Ibid.
7
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and very traditional military force who would not be able to adapt to the tactical
Romans.10
Peter Hunter Blair takes a position in-between both Graham and Collingwood by
claiming that Roman troops “had learned that their opponents had evolved methods of
fighting on open ground which made them formidable enemies.”11 He places a greater
importance on the British chariot as a battle-turning tool than Graham did and writes
that it gave them somewhat of an advantage in open battles, which supports
Collingwood and Myres notions that the British, while no great force, were not as simple
and underdeveloped as is usually claimed.12 However, Blair does state that the Roman
forces’ ability to quickly change tactics in battles against set positions, from which they
had prior experience in due to Rome’s constant wars and aggressive border expansions,
gave the Romans a strong advantage that the British could not overcome.13
Scholars have also written various assessments on Boudicca, and Guy de la
Bédoyère has gone as far as to claim that she may or may not have existed. He argues
that Boudicca was made up by Roman historians who did not like Nero and so when
they wrote about his conquests as Emperor, “in the context of their stories nothing
suited their purpose better than a character that could be depicted as a counterpoise.” 14
He writes that “Boudica was a woman who exhibited all the attributes they would have

10

Webster, Boudica, 28-29.
Peter Hunter Blair, Roman Britain and Early England: 55 B.C. – A.D. 871 (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and
Sons, 1963), 35.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid, 35-36.
14
Guy de la Bédoyère, The Real Lives of Roman Britain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 27.
11
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preferred in a Roman emperor” and thus she made for a good character.15 He
substantiates these claims by writing that she and her king husband, Prasutagus, still
cannot be verified by the archaeology of coinage, in which many other British individuals
of the time have been.16 The only record of her existence is from the two Roman
historians who wrote about her. De la Bédoyère also writes that her very name makes
her existence suspect as well. Her name is made up of different parts of towns and
translates literally to ‘Victory.’ He goes on to argue that it was likely a classicized version
of the name of a Gallic tribal leader that Caesar had defeated or of a name that appears
on the coinage of a different British tribe, as her name resembles a feminized version of
these well-known Celtic names.17
He also mentions that it is unlikely she is real because in her rebellion, “she
presented the Romans with an enemy that could be targeted in a way that virtually
guaranteed defeat for her” and that it is just not believable that a competent
commander would go to battle like this.18 De la Bédoyère concludes his argument by
writing that “she is at best a literary character made up of some elements of truth and
other mythologized features that converted her into a box-office turn,” such as has
happened many times in history with the deeds of many men being attributed to one
figure, like Robin Hood or Hercules.19

15

Ibid.
Guy de la Bédoyère, Defying Rome: The Rebels of Roman Britain (Gloucestershire: Tempus Publishing
Ltd, 2003), 50.
17
Ibid, 48; de la Bédoyère, The Real Lives of Roman Britain, 27.
18
De la Bédoyère, Defying Rome, 46.
19
De la Bédoyère, The Real Lives of Roman Britain, 28.
16
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This was an interesting accusation as there are no other sources I have found
that cast any sort of doubt onto the existence of Boudicca, or even suggestions that her
life may be a collection of legends and mythologies attributed to one person. It seems to
be a widely held belief on the part of every other scholar of Romano-British history that
Boudicca was indeed a real queen who fomented a real rebellion. I will explain my
reasons for agreeing with this assessment in a later chapter, but it is important to note
that, even though de la Bédoyère is one of the more recent scholars to write on
Romano-British history, there has been no evidence to prove that Boudicca’s Rebellion
did not occur and that the small amount of evidence that he gives to disprove her
authenticity is circumstantial at best and not concrete enough.
The life and fate of Boudicca, as she is only mentioned in two Roman sources, is
a point of contention among scholars. Marguerite Johnson writes that Boudicca became
queen after the Romans installed her husband, Prasutagus, as king of the Iceni following
a small Iceni revolt in 47 AD.20 She also claims that during the rebellion, Boudicca chose
her target cities of Camulodunum, Londinium, and Verulamium because “they promised
plunder and little exertion.”21 She then characterizes Boudicca as she appears in both
Roman accounts and compares the differences. This source is therefore not as helpful as
others in determining a full history of Boudicca and her rebellion, since it is mostly an
aggregation of what the primary sources had to offer.

20
21

Marguerite Johnson, Ancients in Action: Boudicca (London: Bristol Classical Press, 2012), 29.
Ibid, 34-35.
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Webster and Donald Dudley write that the evidence that Rome appointed
Prasutagus leader over the Iceni after a prior rebellion is lacking,22 an assessment that
Salway also agrees with.23 Webster and Dudley also write that Boudicca and Prasutagus
cannot have been married after 45 AD and that her entire ancestry is unknown.24 They
even suggest that “it is possible that she was not of Icenian origin at all” as inter-tribal
marriages were apparently common at this time in Britain.25 When discussing her
rebellion, they claim that Suetonius, upon hearing of Boudicca’s rebellion, eventually
made the calculated decision to give up Londinium and Verulamium, knowing that he
would have no chance to defend them from her army with his limited troops, choosing
instead to find a battlefield in which his smaller army would have an advantage.26 They
also claim that because Boudicca did not capture any Roman military positions
Suetonius was able to get supplies and reinforcements, and that this was a key point in
Suetonius’ ability to easily crush the rebellion.27
M. J. Trow contradicts other authors, claiming that Prasutagus was already king
when the Claudian Invasion occurred.28 While Trow agrees that her ancestry is
unknown, he makes odd claims about her personality and several physical traits, even
though there is no primary evidence to support any of this, making his assessment of

22

Donald R. Dudley and Graham Webster, The Rebellion of Boudicca (New York: Barnes and Noble Books,
1962), 47-48.
23
Salway, Roman Britain, 90.
24
Dudley and Webster, The Rebellion of Boudicca, 48.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid, 66.
27
Ibid, 69.
28
M.J. Trow, Boudicca: The Warrior Queen (Phoenix Mill: Sutton Publishing Ltd, 2003), 53.
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Boudicca’s life suspicious.29 As the book progresses, it reads as more of a fictional
narrative than a true account of her life and, as such, cannot be counted on to provide a
clear understanding of both Boudicca and her rebellion.
Collingwood and Myres agree with the assessment that Prasutagus was already
king before the Claudian Invasion and that he surrendered to Roman rule. 30 Their
assessment of the rebellion, however, is interesting in that it reads as a game of ‘cat and
mouse’ between Boudicca and Suetonius, portraying him as worried about the chances
of being defeated and losing Britannia than he is in his depiction by Webster and
Dudley. Collingwood and Myres write that “as soon as he heard that the Iceni had risen,
he marched to the rescue.”31 They describe how Boudicca’s army marched ever closer
and that Suetonius, far outnumbered, was able to outsmart Boudicca by choosing a
battlefield where her numbers were not an advantage, and then easily crushed the
rebellion with superior tactics.32 In the end, they write that Boudicca killed herself by
drinking poison to avoid capture.33
Salway writes of the rebellion like other Romano-British scholars have: that
Suetonius picked the last battlefield to give himself an advantage, and that Boudicca
likely killed herself by drinking poison after defeat.34 However, he differs from
Collingwood and Myres in suggesting that when Suetonius marched back down to
challenge the rebellion, it was because “he was afraid to leave the west unguarded

29

Ibid 53-54.
Collingwood and Myres, Roman Britain and the English Settlements, 99.
31
Ibid, 100.
32
Ibid, 102.
33
Ibid.
34
Salway, Roman Britain, 120-121.
30
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rather than he acted out of terror of Boudicca.”35 This assessment is interesting to note,
as it contrasts with other secondary sources’ depiction of Suetonius being scared of
Boudicca’s campaign.
When discussing how Rome treated Britain after the revolt, Collingwood and
Myres claim that Suetonius had a thirst for vengeance. They write that Suetonius was
completely consumed by the thought of revenge and acted as if he was punishing all of
Britain for the revolt. They claim that “new police-posts were scattered over the
country, and the land of the guilty and suspect tribes was ravaged with terrible
thoroughness. As the year wore on, famine helped.”36 This is interesting as Suetonius’s
vindictive nature seems to come from nowhere, and there is no motivation given as to
what caused such heavy punishment. They also claim that the new procurator, Gaius
Julius Alpinus Classicianus, was worried about this and what it’s possible effects on the
tribute that Britannia was required to send Rome. He therefore petitioned Nero to
replace him, since the British tribes were quickly coming into an increasingly dire
situation with every passing day. Nero eventually replaced him with a more humane
governor, C. Petronius Turpilianus, willing to listen to the natives and who was sent
“with instructions to… keep the peace. These instructions he faithfully obeyed.” 37
Webster writes a similar story of a tyrannical Suetonius. He claims that not only
were rebellious tribes punished, but even those who remained neutral had their lands

35

Ibid, 119-120.
Collingwood and Myres, Roman Britain and the English Settlements, 103.
37
Ibid.
36
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damaged in a clear attempt to create a famine as retribution.38 In addition, he writes
that the Romans “seized or destroyed stores and standing crops” and he claims that
although Tacitus blamed this on the British sending more manpower to the rebellion
than they had tending crops, this is not likely the case as agriculture was an important
part of the British lifestyle.39 They would therefore make sure they had enough
agricultural labor to make sure they could survive the coming seasons. Just like
Collingwood and Myres, Webster also mentions that Julius Classicianus petitioned Nero
to replace Suetonius and that he told the Britons not to worry about Suetonius as he
had a solution.40 As mentioned previously, a new governor was eventually sent to
Britain with a mission of peace and understanding and he lifted all of the sanctions that
were previously placed on the offending tribes.41 All sources covering the aftermath of
the rebellion mention the same timeline of events, which is important because the way
that Rome showed leniency to Britain is likely a large reason that they remained so loyal
to the empire for the next several centuries.
Martin Henig also tells of a similar account but includes the role of Tiberius
Claudius Togidubnus, who succeeded the previous king Verica of the Atrebates tribe
after he was expelled from Britain by the natives. Henig claims that Togidubnus, a native
Briton, accompanied Suetonius in his battle against Boudicca’s army.42 He suggests that
Togidubnus “may also have had a small army of his own. It may have well have been

38

Webster, Boudica, 101.
Ibid.
40
Ibid, 102.
41
Ibid.
42
Martin Henig, The Heirs of King Verica: Culture & Politics in Roman Britain (Gloucestershire: Tempus
Publishing Ltd, 2002), 47.
39
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now that he showed his merit… by playing a crucial role in destroying Boudica.” 43
Although he does not elaborate on what he believes Togidubnus’ role to be, he claims it
is more probable than not that Togidubnus was present at Suetonius’s camp. In
addition, he states that Togidubnus, even though he helped Suetonius against the
Britons, teamed up with Classicianus “as a strong influence in limiting the extent of the
governor’s reprisals” after the end of the rebellion.44 This is interesting to note as most
other accounts do not speak of Togidubnus as having any influence in Roman politics.
However, Henig believes that he was important not only in crushing the rebellion, but
also in stopping Suetonius’s tyranny and having the Roman Empire show mercy to the
Britons.
Stephen Hill and Stanley Ireland also discuss the aftermath of the rebellion, but
their claims run contrary to Henig and supports Webster, Collingwood, and Myres in
their assessments of how Suetonius’ reprisals were halted. Hill and Ireland claim that “it
was only the arrival of a new Procurator, Julius Classicianus, whose chief function was
the development of the Britain’s economy, that brought hope for the future.” 45 They lay
sole responsibility for usurping Suetonius onto Classicianus, though unlike others, they
do not suggest that this was done out of mercy, but rather because the reprisals
“threatened in fact to perpetuate a political and economic disaster in Britain” and it was
his duty as procurator to prevent that.46 They also differ from Webster’s interpretation
of the Roman retaliations and claim that the famine was not created by the Romans,
43

Ibid.
Ibid.
45
Stephen Hill and Stanley Ireland, Roman Britain (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1996), 23.
46
Ibid.
44
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and was in fact the fault of the Britons who depended on winning the rebellion so much,
that they completely forgot about their agricultural duties.47 Hill and Ireland also do not
claim that Turpilianus, the new governor, came with any message of peace and that he
only stopped the reprisals because it was his duty, and he therefore did nothing more to
mend relations.48 They suggest that the reason that Britain became so loyal following
the rebellion was not because of the way that the Romans treated them afterwards, but
rather because the Britons learned “the futility of revolt,” and how they would never be
strong enough to defeat the Roman army.49
Sheppard Frere was of a different opinion regarding the aftermath of the
rebellion. He claims that Classicianus did not petition Nero to recall Suetonius because
of his harsh reprisals or because his reprisals were threatening to adversely affect the
British economy, rather Frere suggests that it was simply because Classicianus was bold
and new. Because he did not like the longstanding economic policies that Suetonius put
in place, he was not afraid to petition for his removal.50 Frere writes that “this man took
a statesman’s view of the situation and was not afraid either to oppose the governor or
to report to Rome adversely upon the fiscal effects of his policies: what was now
required, he submitted, was a new man with a new policy.”51 While Frere does mention
that there were punishments, he claims that it was not much different from Suetonius’
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usual policies of repression and military strength and that Classicianus just did not see
these policies benefitting Britain’s economy.52
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From Caesar to Nero
To fully understand the both Boudicca’s and the Roman Generals’ motivations,
the background of Roman Britain is important. Without knowing the details of how, and
for what reasons, Rome attempted to conquer Britain, the full implications of Boudicca’s
revolution do not have as much of an impact. Rome first became aware of Britannia
during Julius Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul in 57 BC.1 During this time, Britain was divided
along tribal lines which Tacitus mentions worked to their extreme disadvantage as “they
do not act in concert. Seldom is it that two or three states meet together to ward off a
common danger. Thus, while they fight singly, all are conquered.”2 In addition, Tacitus
mentions their less advanced military and their weaponry. He states that their strength
was in their infantry, although some high-ranking men used chariots in battle as well.3
These chariots were not used by armed men to fight, rather they were used as quick
transport in and out of battle. They could transport infantry where needed and move
them out if they needed a retreat, making them a unique and dangerous force. 4
The art of warfare was important to Britons, and they often practiced hand-tohand combat, leading to stark differences between them and the Romans. 5 When
Britons fought, they preferred to fight in the nude, as the typical leather armor available
to them restricted movement with each additional layer, which could create fatal
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mistakes in close combat.6 British fighting tactics also were not nearly as advanced as
the Romans, who were well disciplined and would change stations as battles raged; the
Britons were instead unmoving, preferring to charge head-on with bravery.
Caesar turned his attention to Britannia soon after learning of its existence.
Some scholars suggest that he created an expedition because he believed that Britons
were aiding the Gauls against the Romans in the Gallic War.7 However, others seem to
suggest that he did not actually believe this and only claimed it to gain popular support
for an invasion.8 Caesar never made his true motivations for conquering Britain clear,
but the question arises of why Caesar wanted to risk another war when he was already
involved in one. What is known is that this region had a large concentration of goods
and fertile land that were important for a growing power, and would also provide a
large amount of wealth to whomever controlled it. 9 In addition, trades, such as the
production of a variety of metals, were big and already well-established for centuries in
this region, and with the notable large population, the prospect of increased slavery
would have been attractive to Caesar for both financial and military reasons.
Whatever Caesar’s actual motives were, he decided that an invasion of Britannia
would be advantageous and he attacked with his infantry in 55 BC although his cavalry
never came due to several unfortunate weather-related incidents.10 Even though he
could not chase the Britons with his cavalry to win a truly decisive victory, he was
6
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nevertheless successful with his infantry and offered terms with the British tribes for
peace, which most tribes scorned.11 Caesar soon came back with a proper invasion force
and, although they were met with staunch opposition and unique military tactics, such
as extensive fighting from British chariots and guerrilla warfare, the Britons were
eventually defeated.12 These British forces were led by Cassivellaunus, a tribal king most
likely of the Catuvellauni. Caesar’s second expedition was soon over after more terms
were met and tributes demanded and although Caesar likely wanted to return for yet
another expedition, Gallic revolts in the late 50s BC kept most of his focus. Caesar knew
that the best time to invade Britain would not be when his Gallic campaigns were still
ongoing, and that he would have to wait until they were pacified before he could
consider anything more.
Although there was never another expedition in his lifetime, Roman relations
with Britain slowly developed. Strabo tells us that Caesar’s invasion was so successful,
and the terms he set became so profitable, that it would have been economically
disadvantageous to annex Britannia at the time since “the expense of the army would
offset the tribute-money.”13 Strabo also mentions that trade began between the two
regions, and this trade, as expected, left a Roman influence on Britannia.14 This
cessation of Roman activity from Caesar’s expedition to Claudius’s invasion is not
entirely based in a cost-benefit analysis, however. Expeditions were planned on several
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occasions, however they were never realized due to strife in Roman politics.15 With the
assassination of Caesar and the ensuing civil war, the Romans were too caught up in
their own affairs to even consider annexing Britain. When the civil war ended and
Augustus created the Roman Empire, plans for more expeditions were made on several
occasions, but even then they did not pan out either due to increased activity in Gaul
demanding more attention, or simply because it seemed clear to Augustus that the
British would surrender easily and was therefore not entirely worth his time. 16
However, Rome did not completely forget about Britannia and even though they
still had no incentive for any further expeditions, there was a diplomatic history
between the two regions that even shows Britons respecting the Roman Empire. When
Augustus visited Gaul in 16 BC, the poet Horace wrote that two British kings went to
visit Augustus, and that he accepted their audience and established the beginning of a
relationship.17 Through the evidence of coinage found by archaeologists, this Roman
influence on Britain can also be seen. Kings of British tribes had their names on their
coinage and modern archaeologists have found differences between some coins. While
this practice also helps historians locate the migration trends of various tribes in
Britannia, and even shows the immigration and assimilation of non-British people such
as Gauls into British tribes, the designs of these coins can also show how Roman culture
had spread in the region by the way their designs exhibit certain Roman aspects. For
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example, after visiting Emperor Augustus in 16 BC, one British king, who in turn
influenced others, started to present a very distinctly Roman characteristic on the
design of his coinage.18 It appears that they copied the designs of Gallic coins, who got
their designs from popularly-used Roman coins.19 These British coins appear with laurel
wreathes and other markers indicative of a Roman origin, such as a likely attempt at
creating the profile of Apollo and the presence of horses.20 In addition, coinage from
two different kings were found to have “rex,” the Latin word for “king” inscribed on
them, which, if of a Latin and not Celtic origin as scholars currently believe, shows the
adoption of elements of the Roman language by Britons into their general vocabulary.21
Other items have also been found by archaeologists that show the extent of
Roman influence in Britannia. Archaeologists have found the tombs of kings who, during
their time, held anti-Roman sympathies but it is plain to see how Roman culture has
influenced their burial process.22 British art even began to adapt to a more Roman style
as it imitated Roman artwork. Although it took time for this change to occur,
archaeology can show how silver, copper, and even gold British artwork began to have a
more Roman style in contrast to what was previously created in the region. 23
Collingwood and Myres even claim that Roman fashion had made its way to Britain.24
Furthermore, the degree of the distribution of imported Roman goods, which can be
18
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noticed as being purchased more by British aristocrats than by other classes, shows the
extent of Romanization. These instances are just several of the many items of evidence
suggesting that by this point, even without multiple Roman expeditions into Britain, the
British had overall started to feel the effects of Roman civilization. Even though they
were still considered barbarians by the Romans, they had definitely started to become
Romanized before Claudius’s organized conquest years from this point.
Emperor Claudius eventually saw fit to pick up where Caesar left off and 43 AD
started the widespread invasion of Britannia. This was during the era of Roman
expansion and Claudius, having recently become Emperor and seeking to make his
mark, saw no reason not to finally execute what had been discussed for decades. Aulus
Plautius led 40,000 men, consisting of four legions combined with auxiliaries, to the
shores of East Kent.25 Within the span of a few months, the Romans had already taken
Camulodunum, modern-day Colchester and the capital of the Catuvellauni tribe, who
had recently become the most powerful British tribe in the region.26 They were evicted
from their land and Camulodunum became occupied by the XXth legion as they built a
more permanent base there, and the other legions expanded outward from there in all
directions.27
The defeat of the powerful Catuvellauni so quickly shocked other British tribes,
since the Catuvellauni had led the British opposition against Rome near a century
earlier. Because of this, some tribes pled their loyalty to the Roman Empire not soon
25
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after in hopes that they would be spared while their neighboring enemies were overrun.
They allied themselves with Rome and the Roman Empire made the chieftains of these
tribes client-kings.28 The Iceni, whose capital of Venta Icenorum was located near
modern-day Norfolk, was one of these tribes. 29 This tribe, led by Prasutagus, played a
major role in the Roman Empire’s affairs in Britannia. Sometime before 45 AD,
Prasutagus married Boudicca, through which he had two daughters.30 He and his wife
Boudicca are, interestingly enough, two of only ten people that Tacitus mentions by
name in his Agricola, and are the only two to be named who are British.31
Boudicca is particularly interesting in that, despite being so important to the
history of Roman Britain, and even modern Britain itself, there are little historical
records on her. The entire record of her existence is through Roman historians, who
only wrote about her rebellion and the immediate causes of it, thus leaving modern
historians in the dark concerning anything else about her. However, several assumptions
about basic information on her can be made from these sources. Because her daughters
were raped by Romans, they must have been at least young teenagers, which means
that Boudicca was at least thirty when she started her rebellion.32 However, her
ancestry, if she had any other children, or anything else that could be used to create a
general profile on her is unknown. This is one of de la Bédoyère’s reasons of doubting
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her existence, since other rebels during this time period were more thoroughly
described. Nevertheless, the rebellion did indeed occur and we do know that the Iceni
were allied with Rome.
The title of client-king was, by this point in Roman history, long established.
Rome had allied itself with native rulers in near every new region that they conquered
and those who had surrendered to Rome before they were conquered gained this
relationship. Client-kings kept their general independence and their sovereignty, but
Rome was the true leader of the city and their word was final.33 One of Rome’s laws, the
one which proved to be the catalyst to Boudicca’s revolt, was the condition that, upon
the death of the client-king, Rome would choose a successor from their populace and
the city would be near completely annexed.34 In previous instances, client-kings of large
territories who could offer something valuable to Rome did not have the standard
client-king and could have exceptions made against some laws. However, the three
British kings who became client-kings were not of great value to Rome and therefore
were not of this status, thus the standard rules for client-kingdoms were imposed on
them. While the Iceni were allied to Rome, and the Romans were busy conquering more
of Britannia and subjugating the surrounding tribes, the Iceni enjoyed a general
prosperity. The Romans lent money to them and helped them, however it started to
become clear that Rome did not understand the culture of Britons and how wary they
were of assimilating.

33
34

Dudley and Webster, The Rebellion of Boudicca, 42.
Ibid, 43.

28

The Roman governor of Britannia, Publius Ostorius Scapula, caused a small
rebellion in 47 AD when he disarmed the British tribes. The Iceni, a “proud and
independent people,” who only allied with the Romans to save themselves and
therefore thought of themselves as above this ‘punishment,’ did not take it well.35
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that the Iceni are actually the tribe that Caesar
described as the Cenimagni, which was likely meant to be Iceni Magni, meaning “the
Great Iceni” in Latin.36 As many of the tribes named by Caesar during his expedition
could not be located, it seems plausible that he was referring to the Iceni and simply
made an error. The Cenimagni were one of the five British tribes who submitted to
Caesar during his expeditions and therefore had a better relationship with him. 37 If the
Iceni were indeed the Cenimagni, they would have expected to be treated with greater
respect when the Romans finally appeared again since they had recognized Roman
authority earlier than most other tribes.
The Iceni valued their privacy, their weapons, and their status, and having
Roman troops break into their homes to take their weapons away from them was
considered a great insult. Although the Iceni revolt was quickly put down, 38 the
important point to gain from this event is not that they revolted, but that the Iceni had
made it known that they believe they are above the other tribes and wish to be treated
as such. In addition, it shows that men like Scapula, i.e. the Roman governors, did not
realize how to appease the British masses when they made errors in their governance.
35
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Scapula made a further mistake when, in order to intimidate both the Iceni and their
surrounding tribes so future rebellions would not occur, he drove Britons off nearby
land and built a military base in their place.39 This is one of the actions that that led a
different tribe to sympathize with Boudicca’s cause and take up arms with her.
In the next decade, more of Britannia had become subjugated by Roman
authority and many tribes had found themselves under Roman rule. Emperor Claudius
had died and was succeeded by Nero in 54 AD. By this point however, Nero did not see a
good outlook for a Romanized Britain anytime soon. There was still a large amount of
territory to conquer in the region and with all these small rebellions, there was more
money tied up in his keeping their military presence active than there was money
coming into the Empire.40 The conquest of Britannia had not been living up to prior
expectations and it was likely that he was not the only Roman who felt this way. The
historian Suetonius even mentions that Nero had considered withdrawing completely,
but, because an annexed Britannia was his adopted father’s vision, he pursued the
matter in to continue his legacy.41 Nero did, however, encourage the governors of
Britain to act more aggressive and push to conquer more territory instead of settling
conflicts between tribes. Scapula, along with both of the governors that succeeded him,
had died, allowing Nero to appoint Gaius Suetonius Paulinus to the office in 57 AD.42
This appointment was very calculated as Suetonius was a great military strategist and
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proved his resolve as a general in terrain unfamiliar to most Romans through his
successful campaigns against the rebel Moors in Africa.43 Because it is reasonable to
assume that he’d likely be useful in doing the same in Britain, Nero chose him to fulfill
what others failed. His predecessor, Quintus Veranius, had started to draw up plans to
conquer territories in the north but had died after only a year in office and Nero left this
task to Suetonius.44
In 59 AD, Prasutagus died but left behind a will stating how he would like Venta
Icenorum governed, leaving his wife Boudicca as Queen of the Iceni.45 The Romans,
however, must not have forgiven the Iceni for their revolt twelve years earlier because
they disregarded his will completely and saw fit to humiliate the Iceni. The ‘nobles’ were
completely ransacked by centurions, all relatives of Prasutagus were enslaved, Boudicca
was publically flogged, her two daughters were raped, the town’s massive loans and
debts were called in, and Rome installed a Roman governor in Venta Icenorum who
demanded a large number of both tribute and recruits.46 Perhaps this was punishment
for the Iceni thinking they were above other British tribes and this was Rome’s way of
humbling them. Perhaps the Romans sought to show everyone the insolence of
Boudicca for thinking she could be queen by punishing her familial line, or perhaps it
could even have been entirely a coincidence or something that happened to other tribes
as well, only becoming noteworthy in this case because of its consequences. However,
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in the end the result was the same: if the Iceni were insulted at having their weapons
taken from them, this incredible disrespect to the royal line in the wake of their king’s
death was not only embarrassing for them in front of the other British tribes, but an
unforgivable act in need of a swift and just response.
The Iceni found an ally in the Trinovantes, another tribe who felt slighted and
insulted by the Roman Empire. They were also one of the first tribes conquered by the
Romans after Claudius’s invasion and they never forgave the Romans for taking part of
their land to build both a military base, the base constructed by Ostorius after the Iceni
revolt in 47 AD, and a new Roman colony established in Camulodunum.47 They were
also upset about the tributes and taxes that they had to pay to Rome as part of their
alliance. In addition, they were unhappy about the settling policy that Roman soldiers
followed concerning land rights. While there did not seem to be a law concerning how
Roman veterans could take previously conquered lands, there does exist a history of
Roman veterans doing so, and this did not change when they came to Britannia.48 The
Trinovantes, existing near the center of Roman rule due to their close proximity to
Camulodunum and the landing site for Roman parties, therefore often had veterans
driving them off their own land.49
Over the next several years, this practice, combined with the inaction of
mediating these seizures, convinced many of the Trinovantes of the benefits in revolting
with Boudicca. However, the single greatest act that pushed the Trinovantes to flock to
47
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Boudicca was their required maintenance of the temple of the deified Emperor Claudius
that was built near them.50 While they were upset by previous mandates of the Roman
authority, they ended up becoming tasked with caring for what R.G. Collingwood and
J.N.L. Myres called “the symbol of Rome’s dominance among them,” and this became
too much for their honor.51 Just as the Iceni regarded themselves as Caesar’s Cenimagni,
and therefore more deserving of a higher privilege than the other British tribes, the
Trinovantes were also previously held in higher regard by Caesar and felt undeserving of
their current fate. When Caesar made his first expedition, the Trinovantes exhibited a
pro-Roman sentiment and as a reward, one of Caesar’s terms with the other British
tribes was that a rival tribe, the nearby Catuvellauni, would no longer harass them. 52
Unfortunately, just like the Iceni, the Romans gave them no special favors and so, when
hearing of Boudicca’s planned rebellion, they decided that this was their chance of
returning to their former glory and joined her.
Although Boudicca’s rebellion is the most famous British revolt against the
Romans, there was an earlier insurrection that, even though it had failed, showed the
British that it may have been possible for them to drive out the Romans. Caratacus, one
of the sons of the Catuvellaunian king, fought against Rome from the invasion in 43 AD
to his capture in 51 AD.53 Even though his capital city was conquered by the Romans, he
did not surrender and he went up to Wales to instigate the tribes there. This region of
Britannia, occupied by the Silures, had been largely untouched by previous Roman
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influence and as such, they had no reason to give in to Roman authority. Indeed,
Ostorius found that he could offer nothing to them to gain their loyalty.54
Caratacus gathered more Welsh tribes to follow him and although he never won
a single battle in his entire eight-year campaign, and was eventually captured and
shipped off to Rome, he was successful in that he was able to last so long.55 Caratacus
showed Britons that they too might stand a chance against Rome by showing that if he,
a failed military commander, could last so long against the Romans, maybe a capable
commander could defeat them. However, what Boudicca and her allies failed to realize
was that Caratacus lasted so long by gaining the support of tribes that had never
encountered the true power of the Roman military and what they were capable of on
the battlefield. There is no evidence to suggest that any of the Catuvellauni followed
Caratacus when he fled to Wales to create a new army, maybe because having seen
firsthand how strong the Romans were, they knew it was futile.56 The Welsh, knowing
nothing of Roman tactics and units, believed they might have a chance.
The Iceni and the Trinovantes started to plan their revolt but they found their
biggest problem to be the strong Roman military presence in their midst. They knew the
power of the Roman legions and even if they believed in their cause, they knew that the
rebellion would not last long if most of the Roman army could be quickly dispatched to
them. Their time came in 60 AD when Suetonius took the brunt of the Roman army and
moved northward into Wales to combat the druids who lived there. The druids were
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known to Romans since Caesar’s expedition over a century beforehand, and they were
responsible for a lot of the anti-Roman sentiment in the north. They used both their
position as religious figureheads and magic to convince locals, in a show of divine
power, to rise up against the Romans. The druids were successful in fomenting small
rebellions and this had been a great nuisance for the Roman governors for decades by
this point.57 Suetonius had not been governor for very long and he wished to show Nero
and the Roman people that he would not waste his time in his position. While there
were not many governors before him, some were so ineffective that they were easily
forgotten.
Suetonius therefore decided to finish this problem once and for all and, because
he required such a large force to ensure victory, he took many of the Roman troops
occupied in south Britannia with him. After Boudicca and her allies noticed that the
south of Britain was left largely ungarrisoned by Roman troops, they saw this moment
as their best and possibly only chance of having a successful start and rose up in arms.58
The rebellion had started well for the British: Suetonius was hundreds of miles
away, Roman cities were left undefended and vulnerable, and a force Cassius Dio
numbers 120,000 strong lined up behind her. This was the result of years of unfair
subjugation by Romans which the British felt were insults to their people and their
customs. These British tribes had over a century of conflict with Rome and this became
their chance to finally gain their homes back.
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The Rebellion and its Consequences
While the size of Boudicca’s army was probably not what Cassius Dio recorded,
she most likely did command a large force after consolidating the Iceni and the
Trinovantes. Boudicca used her large army to raze three Roman cities to the ground and
won victories against the contingents that Suetonius had sent to stop her. But in the
end, Boudicca failed in part because of the reasons that Suetonius prevailed. Were it not
both for Boudicca arrogantly pressing her advance instead of being cautious and
continuing her winning strategy, and for Suetonius’s smart judgement in knowing both
when and where to make his stand, Boudicca could very easily have overcome the odds
and defeated a large part of the Roman army in Britain. Considering that Nero already
had to be convinced, by this point, to continue his presence in Britain, a defeat like this
may have been sufficient enough to change his mind. If she had defeated Suetonius, the
remaining Roman Legions in Britannia would be left without a commander and too
scattered to successfully combat the threat she posed. It likely would have resulted in
the necessary withdrawal of the Roman military, at least until they could send
reinforcements. Nevertheless, Boudicca’s Rebellion was a tremendous undertaking by
the Britons and the fact that they were able to coordinate so well and enjoyed great
success in the initial stages of their war is unprecedented and a sign of their strength.
As mentioned earlier, once Suetonius moved his forces north in a campaign
against the druids, Boudicca and the Iceni saw this as the proper time to strike. Dio
describes in detail the moment that Boudicca exhorts the Britons to war. In his passage,
he gives her both masculine and feminine traits. He writes that, even though she had
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“hair [that] fell to her hips,”1 she also “possessed a greater intelligence than [that which]
often belongs to women”2 and that “she was very tall, in appearance most terrifying, in
the glance of her eye most fierce, and her voice was harsh.”3 This description, while
claiming that she may have been in some ways traditionally feminine, attributes traits
typically ascribed to very masculine commanders rather than noble women. Noble
women, at least in the Roman tradition, are not thought of as tall and imposing people,
with deep gravely voices. Dio also recorded a speech that she supposedly gave to her
countrymen in order to galvanize her cause.
Her speech is split into three different chapters with each chapter focusing on a
different aspect. The first chapter deals with the poor way that the Romans treat them:
Boudicca claims that the Britons “have been deceived by the alluring promises of the
Romans.”4 She speaks of the annual taxes they have to pay and “how much better it
would be to have been sold to masters once for all than, possessing empty titles of
freedom, to have to ransom ourselves every year.”5 In this comparison to slavery,
Boudicca explains “even dying is not free of cost with them… [because of the] fees we
deposit even for our dead. Among the rest of mankind death frees even those who are
in slavery to others; only in the case of the Romans do the very dead remain alive for
their profit.”6
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The second chapter detailing Boudicca’s speech moves onto a different form of
rhetoric where she placed both tribes under common circumstances to unite them
together. She said that “although we inhabit so large an island… and although we
possess a veritable world of our own and are so separated by the ocean from all… [that]
even [outsider’s] wisest men, have not hitherto known for a certainty even by what
name we are called, we have… been despised and trampled underfoot.”7 Through
saying this, she threw out the differences between the British tribes in order to unite
them against a common enemy. By using ‘we’ so many times, and by saying that ‘we
inhabit this land’ and ‘people did not know what to call us,’ Boudicca is showing them
that they are the same and thus should fight as one. Considering that before the
Romans came, the different tribes of Britain fought with one another frequently, it was
necessary to make them understand that, although in relation to one another they are
different, in relation to everyone else they are one country. Boudicca goes on to say
“though we have not done so before, let us, my countrymen and friends and kinsmen –
for I consider you all my kinsmen, seeing that you inhabit a single island and are called
by one common name… do our duty while we still remember what freedom is.” 8
The third chapter of Boudicca’s speech is used to empower the Britons against
the Romans. In this part, she claimed that the Romans “are superior to us neither in
numbers nor in bravery.”9 She spoke about how the Roman military uses armor and
how Romans are prone to setting up walls to defend their fortifications. Connecting
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these two observations, she states that because Britons do neither of these things, since
they prefer to fight in the nude and traditionally did not heavily fortify their cities, they
“enjoy a surplus of bravery” compared to the weaker Romans.10 In addition, she says
that their guerilla tactics are superior because the Romans “can neither pursue anybody,
by reason of their heavy armour, nor yet flee; and if they ever do slip away from us, they
take refuge in certain appointed spots, where they shut themselves up as in a trap.” 11
Since they have the home field advantage, they both knew where it was best to fight
and had the ability to slip in and out the battlefields quickly. Furthermore, she claimed
that the Romans are not as strong as Britons are, due to the difference in lifestyles. She
said that “they cannot bear up under hunger, thirst, cold, or eat as we can. They require
shade and covering, they require kneaded bread and wine and oil, and if any of these
things fails them, they perish; for us… any grass or root serves as bread, the juice of any
plant as oil, any water as wine, any tree as a house.”12 She concludes her speech by
telling her followers to show the Romans “that they are hares and foxes trying to rule
over dogs and wolves,” having sufficiently motivated an army to battle.13
Dio then writes of how Boudicca divined where the first battle against the
Romans would take place. She had kept a hare in her dress and after letting it escape,
she marked the direction and course that it ran as a divine showing to where she should
lead her army to.14 This led her straight to Camulodunum, the former capital of the
Trinovantes which the Romans took from them to convert into an outpost. At this point
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in the rebellion, Tacitus’s account starts to become more detailed. He had earlier only
quickly described the circumstances that led to the rebellion, and begins his account
mostly at the destruction of Camulodunum. Tacitus writes that “it appeared… [to be] no
difficult matter to destroy the colony, undefended as it was by fortifications, a
precaution neglected by our generals… the ocean had worn the aspect of blood, and,
when the tide ebbed, there had been left the likeness of human forms.”15
Boudicca had quickly taken the city and started killing every Roman veteran
living there. She had completely overwhelmed them due to both her large numbers and
tactics of surprise, causing survivors to hide themselves in a temple. Because Suetonius
had moved the bulk of the Roman army away from the region, the survivors appealed to
the procurator, Catus Decianus, to send help.16 Unfortunately for them, however, “all he
did was to send two hundred men, and no more, without regular arms, and there was in
the place but a small military force.”17 Tacitus writes that the Roman soldiers and
survivors were embarrassingly unprepared, “trusting to the protection of the temple,
hindered too by secret accomplices in the revolt,” they did not construct any defenses in
the temple and did not try to evacuate any women, children, or elderly people.18 After a
two-day siege, the temple was burned and the result was total annihilation.
Unbeknownst to Boudicca however, Petilius Cerialis, the commander of the
ninth legion, the Legio IX Hispana, was on his way to Camulodunum to try to help the
survivors. This legion would have been battle-tested since they had already been
15
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involved in the suppression of British troops. It therefore probably seemed more than
sufficient to send one legion down to crush the rebellion, considering the ease of taking
this region and that every other rebellion to this point was easily put down by only a
small number of troops. Roman Legions were usually around 10,000 soldiers, an equal
number of legionnaires and auxiliaries, but this paled in comparison to the size of her
army.19 Boudicca met the IX Legion in battle and won a decisive victory, routing
Cerialis’s troops by crushing his entire infantry with only some cavalry escaping the
onslaught.20 The IX Legion was completely destroyed and because of this total defeat,
Catus Decianus, the procurator who supplied the Roman forces, fled his post and settled
in Gaul.21 Cerialis was rash in his willingness to fight. He underestimated, not only how
capable a commander Boudicca was, but how strong the Britons could be when united
thusly, and he paid the price.
Boudicca pressed her advantage and moved on to Londinium, a newly made
Roman city and “though undistinguished by the name of a colony, was much frequented
by a number of merchants and trading vessels.”22 Londinium was founded as a planned
urban center and was located in a strategic position for international trade by sea. This
was therefore an image of Roman influence and Boudicca hoped that by attacking it, she
would both undermine Roman control of the region and cripple Rome’s financial ability.
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While traveling to Londinium, Dio claims that an increasing amount of Britons joined her
cause and her army grew tremendously.23
Suetonius had now heard of what had been going on in his absence, how
Camulodunum was destroyed and the IX Legion massacred. He understood that this
threat was a credible one. Leaving his army, he quickly traveled to Londinium before
Boudicca could get there.24 While Suetonius wanted to make a stand at the city, Tacitus
writes that he did not want to make the same mistake as Cerialis by underestimating
Boudicca’s capability. He ordered an evacuation of the town and left it for the rebels to
conquer, since “he resolved to save the province at the cost of a single town.”25 While
this may seem like an unwise move, he understood the grave nature of the threat and
he knew what the consequences would if he were to be defeated. If he staged a battle
in Londinium and suffered the same defeat as Cerialis, the resulting blow to the Roman
army could very well threaten Roman control of the entire region. In addition to the
damage of his reputation, there would be no army large enough nearby to take the
region back in a timely manner. Unfortunately, even though Suetonius fled with
everyone that could leave, not everyone left. Tacitus claims that “those who were
chained to the spot by the weakness of their sex, or the infirmity of age, or the
attractions of the place, were cut off by the enemy.”26 Just as at Camulodunum,
Boudicca burned Londinium to the ground.
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After Londinium, Boudicca turned her attention to Verulamium. This city was
also founded by the Romans as a planned urban community and had grown to be
symbolic of Roman might. The primary sources do not mention much about the city,
only that Boudicca conquered it soon after taking Londinium and before marching up
Watling Street where she met Suetonius.
Based on past British fighting style and Dio’s account of Boudicca trying to
reclaim their lifestyle these victories that Boudicca had won were likely accomplished
through guerilla warfare. The Britons could, as Dio mentions, slip in and out of forests to
attack and since Dio claims that they were not well-armed, guerilla tactics make the
most sense. In the battle outside of Camulodunum, for example, only the cavalry were
able to flee. In this case, British chariots were likely used, enabling Boudicca to quickly
and effectively encircle the opposing army. Her use of guerilla tactics therefore played a
large part in securing victory and was indicative of advantages she could have had if only
she did not change strategies. Roman forces at this time did not have much experience
battling these quick tactics. Boudicca was a capable commander and, since she was able
to rally her troops effectively and march on, she had a good chance of beating back the
Romans. Historians can estimate her age because she had at least teenage children by
60 AD, so she would have been alive when the Claudian invasion of Britain occurred. She
therefore would have known how the Roman military triumphed over British forces in
regular combat, and aware of the fact that they could not fight them as well when easily
ambushed. She would have known that her strength lay in hiding in wait and striking at
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a marching force. But Suetonius plotted to take away her advantages of large numbers
and guerilla tactics, and Boudicca fell into the trap.
While historians do not know exactly where the final battle between Boudicca
and Suetonius was fought, historians believe that it was most likely on Watling Street
near Lactodorum, modern Towcester, or Manduessedum, which is modern Mancetter. 27
Suetonius called the XIV Legion and veterans of the XX Legion, and had altogether a
little over ten thousand soldiers,28 which would not be nearly enough to fight the horde
that Dio estimated had now reached 230,000 people.29 Suetonius would have been
utterly engulfed by this large force so he knew he had to use their large numbers against
them. He chose a site “approached by a narrow defile, closed in at the rear by a forest,
having first ascertained that there was not a soldier of the enemy except in his front,
where an open plain extended without any danger from ambuscades.” 30 In other words,
he knew he would be ambushed so he chose a narrow battlefield where he could
extend his own lines as widely Boudicca would be able to. The site was narrow enough
that he could extended his lines all the way through, being able to reinforce it as well,
and Boudicca would not be able to use her superior manpower and chariots to encircle
and rout them as she did with Cerialis.
Suetonius essentially tried to trap Boudicca; she had to travel on Watling Street
from Verulamium to advance and he knew he could catch her and force her to fight
there. By this point in the rebellion, Boudicca had faced the Romans multiple times and
27
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never even lost a significant part of her army. But this was only because of her guerilla
ambushes, which allowed her forces to engulf and destroy the enemy from all sides,
combined with the Roman mindset of ‘dumb barbarians’ not knowing how to properly
wage war. Suetonius made sure that these previous advantages would no longer be a
problem.
That tables had been turned and now Boudicca was the rash commander. She
took this as her opportunity to, as she exclaims in her pre-battle speech, avenge “lost
freedom, my scourged body, [and] the outraged chastity of my daughters.” 31 From the
Roman sources, Boudicca obviously seems overconfident. Tacitus claims that they were
“exulting [at the battlefield] … so fierce in spirit that they actually brought with them, to
witness the victory, their wives riding in wagons, which they had placed on the extreme
border of the plain.”32 Dio claims that they just walked at a normal pace into the fray
once the battle started, confident that this combination of legions would be no match
for them.33 She must have thought that with a force allegedly twenty-three times that of
the enemy, and knowing how the Romans had underestimated her so, she could defeat
any army thrown at her. So she rode into battle calmly and this became her biggest
mistake.
Suetonius set his army into a wedge-formation and, because of his stronger
cavalry, quickly broke through the British resistance. Tacitus claims that the Britons had
started to retreat, but due to the massive amount of reinforced lines and the family-
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filled wagons they placed behind them, it was too difficult to flee and they were easily
slaughtered.34 Tacitus writes that a little less than eighty-thousand Britons were killed,
while only four hundred Romans were killed with an equal amount wounded. 35 Even if
the actual numbers are a fraction of that, it is still a resounding Roman victory. Tacitus
and Dio offer conflicting accounts of what happened afterwards, if Boudicca killed
herself to escape capture or died of illness immediately after, but the end result is the
same: the rebellion was quashed.36
The short-lived rebellion had come so far under Boudicca’s command. They took
three cities and wiped out almost an entire Roman legion, which is farther than any
British force had done up to this point. Had Boudicca not faced Suetonius at Watling
Street, as Suetonius was running out of supplies and could not keep up his war against
Boudicca for much longer,37 Boudicca could have moved on with her campaign. She
could have easily conquered the other legions in the forests of Britain, where Roman
infantry and cavalry struggled against her usual tactics, and forced Nero to withdraw the
Roman presence from Britain. Unfortunately, Boudicca had was not cautious enough
and thought her forces to be invulnerable when faced with the full might and power of
the Roman military, something which undeveloped militaries like Britons did not stand
much of a chance against.
Boudicca’s position, with such a seemingly different attitude than her previous
fights, is one the reasons that de la Bédoyère doubts the existence of Boudicca. As
34
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stated before, one of the reasons that he believes she is a made up character by the
Romans is because “by gathering her forces together in a single straggling army, she
presented the Romans with an enemy that could be targeted in such a way that virtually
guaranteed defeat for her.” Which is something he believes that no capable commander
would do.38 This evidence, however, overlooks the fact the role that religion and
righteous belief played in this rebellion.
The Briton’s religious figures, namely the druids, were inciting Britons to battle,
claiming that it was through their gods’ divine will that they fight back against the
Romans.39 In fact, Dio writes multiple accounts of Boudicca invoking the name of
Andraste and Andate, who he claims are the goddesses of war and victory,
respectively.40 Before setting out to Camulodunum, Boudicca called upon Andraste to
lead them into battle, since it is in her name of war that they seek freedom. 41 In
addition, Dio claims that at the cities that she conquered, Boudicca made multiple
sacrifices to Andate, who the Britons believed was helping them.42 Moreover, Boudicca
was a religious woman who trusted Andraste on where to first be led into battle when
she divined her will. She trusted her religion to guide her in her efforts and with this
divine guidance on her side, combined with the multiple unprecedented victories over
the Roman army, she must have believed that she was blessed and decided to press her
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luck in this attempt. Unfortunately for her, the confidence that her religious beliefs gave
her were not enough to challenge the Roman Empire.
Evidence suggesting that a victory at the Battle of Watling Street could have
forced the Romans to withdraw from Britannia comes from the story of Arminius, the
German leader of the Cherusci tribe who Tacitus claimed “assuredly… was the deliverer
of Germany.”43 Arminius was the leader of a coalition against Roman incursions into
Germania and it was through his victories that the Romans were forced to retreat
behind the Rhine river and no longer attempt an occupation.44 The Battle of the
Teutoburg Forest in 9 AD was the start of Arminius’s victories. In this battle, Arminius
and his troops set a trap for the Roman army, which consisted of three legions and over
20,000 men, and ambushed them.45 The result was the total annihilation of all three
legions.46 Although there were more battles involved in this war before Rome finally
withdrew in 17 AD, the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest proved to Rome that their efforts
to take Germania may have been futile.
There are parallels in the cases of Boudicca and Arminius that lead one to believe
Roman policy for the two would be similar as well. Both leaders were responsible for
creating and keeping an alliance among native tribes against the Roman Empire and
both were responsible for a great victory over the Romans, though situations do differ in
key areas too. 47 9 AD was during the era of Augustus’s expansion and with Germania
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being on the territorial frontier of the Roman Empire, it was both necessary and easy to
send reinforcements to ensure success. Britannia, however, required ships to transport
troops and there had been a tendency of weather-related accidents delaying or
destroying fleets. It was therefore much easier to send more manpower to Germania
than Britannia if the need arose. Considering that the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest and
the proven capability of Arminius was a large factor in Rome’s withdrawal from
Germania, if Boudicca had succeeded at the Battle of Watling Street and defeated over
two of the four total legions brought to Britannia, it is conceivable that Rome would
have withdrawn from there as well. It would not have been efficient for Nero to send
reinforcements to Britannia before Rome could fully make a plan that would minimize
future losses and guarantee victory, such as in the case of Germania.
After Boudicca’s rebellion had been quashed, Suetonius quickly resumed
command of Britannia and led a series of harsh reprisals.48 No reasons are given for why
he did so, and it therefore seems like more of a personal vendetta than anything else.
Some historians argue that he justified his reprisals based on Boudicca’s ruthlessness to
her prisoners, namely that she did not take any.49 Tacitus claims that after capturing any
territory, Boudicca’s army was only interested in any physical wealth that they could
easily plunder, and not much else, which included Roman citizens.50 He writes that “it
was not on making prisoners and selling them, or on any of the barter of war, that the

48

Tacitus, Book XIV, Annales.
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
49

50

enemy was bent, but on slaughter, on the gibbet, the fire and the cross, like men soon
about to pay the penalty, and meanwhile snatching at instant vengeance.” 51
While Boudicca is viewed by many modern Britons as a one of the first patriots
of her country and have respect for her, she was merciless in her dealings and showed
this side at every city that she conquered. While Tacitus does not write much about
what happened to the Roman citizens of the towns that Boudicca took, Dio devotes a
significant section to the atrocities she and her army committed, which he called an
“indescribable slaughter... subjected to every known form of outrage.”52 He says that
there were a lot of carnage involved, but he only writes about a few: including cutting
off noble Roman women’s breasts and sewing them to their mouths and afterwards
impaling them lengthwise on skewers,53 disembowelment while alive, and “perish[ing]
by being melted in boiling water.”54 Though it is not known how many people she
subjected these treatments to, Tacitus claims that she killed a total of 70,000 Roman
citizens and allies between the three cities that she took, and a fair amount were likely
through these methods.55 These harsh actions may be the reason that Suetonius treated
the Britons so harshly after defeating the rebellion, especially since had to leave people
in Londinium and likely sent them to this fate. But Dio’s account of the rebellion seems
less reliable than Tacitus’s and with several contradictions between the two, it is likely
that Tacitus’s is the more accurate source.
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Because Tacitus had a father-in-law fight in Suetonius’s army, for whom he
wrote the Agricolae, he has a unique insight into the rebellion which other historians
would not have. His father-in-law actually fought in the Battle of Watling Street
alongside Suetonius and he therefore would be able to know exactly what happened
during this campaign better than other Romans. Dio had no such luxury and his account
comes over a century later, when he would be unable to interview people who were
present at the time for accurate statements. While it is likely that there are many facts
in his account, the mere fact that he disagrees with Tacitus on some minor things, such
as how Boudicca died, means that it is probable that there are more inconsistencies in
his story. These atrocities are also almost entirely unmentioned by Tacitus, since all he
states is a suggestion that they hanged, burned, and crucified Romans for a more
instantaneous vengeance.56 If such carnage actually did take place, Tacitus would have
known and would have included it in his works. The fact that he does not specifically
mention these in his deep account of the rebellion means that they were likely
exaggerated by Dio, which was not uncommon for historians of this time. Most likely
Dio embellished rumors of what Britons did to their prisoners, if not entirely fabricated
them, in order to give a just cause for the Roman reprisals after the rebellion. This is
corroborated by recent inconclusive archaeological evidence. While there is proof that
Boudicca burned the cities that she captured, since during excavations on them a layer
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of burnt debris was found that would coincide with this time frame,57 there is no
evidence of any mass graves that impaling tens of thousands of people would leave.

Tacitus does not write exactly what policies Suetonius initiated after the
rebellion, though he does mention that he was anything but merciful. Unfortunately,
Dio also does not mention Boudicca’s story any longer after her defeat so it is difficult to
understand exactly happened, but with recent archaeological work, historians have
been able to extrapolate a possible answer. Nevertheless, it is likely that these harsh
policies were not entirely the work of Suetonius, and were initiated under the
suggestion of Nero as a method of converting the region into a loyal colony. A similar
method appears in Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince.
In one chapter of The Prince, Machiavelli writes about what a prince should do
with new territory acquired by the arms of others. He describes how Francesco Sforza
had acquired the Romagna region in Italy. However, the people of this region were
vastly different than him in culture and he found it hard to unify them and give them
laws.58 So Sforza appointed a governor to the territory who had the responsibility to do
this, and was very cruel in his practice.59 As a result of his cruelty, the people of
Romagna utterly hated him, and Sforza knew this. In order to “clear himself in the minds
of the people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty
had been practiced, it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of the
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minister.”60 Sforza had his governor executed and left him dead in the middle of a
piazza. When the people then saw this, they flocked to him and Machiavelli claims that
Sforza had successfully won over the people of Romagna for the rest of his time there.
This method is reminiscent of Nero’s position in Britannia. Nero had acquired
Britannia from Claudius, who started the Roman invasion, and had a governor in the
territory, Suetonius, who was constantly conquering more land for him. In addition, the
Britons were lawless like the Romagna people and Nero was attempting to give them
Roman culture. Just like Sforza, he knew that he could make them loyal to him by
creating a scapegoat, and it worked to a degree. Although the Britons never became
fiercely loyal to Nero, they eventually showed allegiance to the Roman Empire and
never again did a British citizen try to push their presence out of Britannia.
Suetonius’s first policy after the rebellion started when he “harried the lands of
the tribes which had rebelled or even appeared to be indifferent.”61 By doing this,
Suetonius created a famine because the Britons relied heavily on agriculture and this
was devastating to the local population. Suetonius also created new Roman police-posts
that he “scattered over the country.”62 This food crisis and surveillance crackdown
ravaged the British people until Julius Classicianus, the procurator, petitioned to have
him removed as governor. Finally, in 61 AD, Nero acquiesced and recalled Suetonius,
sending Petronius Turpilianus to be governor in his place.63 Tacitus writes that
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Turpilianus “was sent out to initiate a milder rule” which he immediately did.64 As
governor of Britannia, he stopped Suetonius’s harsh reprisals and oppression against the
British people and took a more conciliatory approach. He did not attempt to conquer
any more lands in Britannia and instead focused on improving relations. Turpilianus was
in the middle of his consulship at Rome when he resigned that post in favor of moving
to Britannia, so this was obviously a careful decision.65 In 63 AD, after improving peace
with the Britons for two years, Turpilianus gave up his post and handed it over to
Trebellius Maximus who, just like Turpilianus, continued his mission of reconciliation
and did not attempt any more wars in Britannia.66
This approach was a concentrated effort by Nero to assure that the Britons
would become loyal to the Roman Empire. Nero knew that Britannia could easily have
become completely lost, and in fact he was ready to give up the country as it was
becoming too much of a headache for the empire.67 Because of previous poor Roman
policies, the Britons did not just despise the Romans, but abhorred them. In Boudicca’s
speech before setting out to Camulodunum, she speaks to her army about “a hatred of
present conditions, that hatred you already have.”68 Clearly the Romans had made a
misstep in their foreign policy and did not take into account just how much the Britons
would come to scorn them in the seventeen years of their occupation. This hatred
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caused problems for the Romans as an ideology is hard to wipe out of a population.
Even though Boudicca’s rebellion was defeated, without improving relations there were
still conditions for a second rebellion, possibly one with even more tribes participating.
Moreover, the new commander of this future rebellion might be smarter and be aware
of Boudicca’s mistakes, and it is probable that he could finish what she started.
This tactic by Nero was calculated and ingenious. He knew that just changing
policy would not have a great effect on the Britons’ mindset towards the Roman Empire.
If Suetonius was to just stop his aggressive expansion, the Britons would have thought
that the Romans were scared of another revolt and that they were weak. However, by
having Suetonius exact personal revenge and then recalling him in light of a ‘scandal,’ on
the pretext of the new procurator concluding that his governing of the state would
cause a complete economic collapse, Nero could make it seem as if these misfortunes
were never his attention and mark himself a respected figure.
With a more merciful governor, Britain became Romanized in a slower and less
aggressive manner, not by force and cruelty as was under the previous governors. The
way that Rome previously tried to Romanize Britannia was done hastily and proved to
be ineffective in its use. For example, Britons were forced to take on large debts by the
Romans for items they did not need and then had it called back at random.
Furthermore, Rome attempted to quickly destroy their culture and history, such as
when they evicted everyone out of Camulodunum to make it an outpost. Nero realized
that such hatred after only seventeen years of occupation did not make the goal of
keeping Britannia a long-term possibility. He recognized the faults in their previous
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policies and understood that the fastest way to sway the Britons’ minds in favor of
Rome lay with scapegoating Suetonius. In the end this was a gamble by Nero, as sending
a more conciliatory governor could have showed the Britons that the Romans were
weak and could be scared into leaving Britannia, but it paid off well and ensured the
loyalty of the region for hundreds of years after his reign ended.
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Conclusion
Compared to the development of both their Gallic neighbors and the longestablished Mediterranean powers, the Britons were far behind. Their tribal system was
much more simple than Gaul’s, having come into prominence only through the
influence of Gallic immigrants, and by this point other powers existed in the world which
had long surpassed tribal conflicts and started to have influence in global affairs. The
Roman Empire was such a power, and by the beginning of their conquest of Britannia in
43 AD, Rome had far-reaching capabilities and great technological prowess. In contrast,
individual British tribes were still fighting for dominance in the region and there
seemingly existed no common identity with which to unify under. They were less
advanced than Rome in nearly all aspects including agriculturally, politically, and
militarily. The Britons put up a fight when Emperor Claudius and his forces invaded, but
they were easily defeated by the more-disciplined, better-equipped, and smarter
Roman military, and several British tribes surrendered. These circumstances make it all
the more interesting that one woman could have united several large tribes in southeast Britannia, creating an army hundreds of thousands strong, in a bid to push the
Romans out of Britannia. Of even greater interest is the fact that, in the face of
overwhelming British military failures to combat the Romans at this point, she had a
good chance of turning the tables and creating a major problem for the Roman Empire’s
interests in Britannia.
When the Romans conquered Britannia, they quickly began the long process of
Romanization, intending to impose their own customs and culture on Britons and
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assimilate them as quickly as they could. They enforced their rule on British tribes,
deciding who would be king of which tribe, what they would do with occupied land, and
had the ability to dictate how each king would deal with day to day minutiae. They also
encouraged Britons to take loans and buy frivolous items that were indicative of Roman
culture. In addition, they started construction of specifically Roman buildings, such as
the temple to the deified Claudius near Camulodunum that they tasked the Trinovantes
with caring for. Unfortunately for the Romans, they did not take into account how the
Britons would react to such a drastic change in their lifestyle in such a short period of
time, and general unrest began to grow.
Small rebellions broke out in the country, such as the Iceni Rebellion of 47 AD,
and was indicative of a larger problem but the Romans were too focused on expansion
to care about the everyday problems of already-subjugated peoples. Their greatest
mistake came in 59 AD when King Prasutagus died and attempted to install Boudicca as
queen; it seems that either the Romans were so focused on other tasks that they did not
explain to him that he did not have the power to choose his successor, or he figured
that the Romans would be okay with it and that it was worth a try. Nevertheless, Rome
further fractured their interests in Britannia by placing a Roman ruler of the Iceni and
humiliating Boudicca possibly as punishment for thinking she had the right to rule. The
Romans were so occupied with the thought of controlling Britannia as quickly as
possible that they did not take fully into account how the Britons would react and
underestimated their ability to stand together in the face of perceived tyranny.
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By 59 AD, it had only been sixteen years since the Romans invaded Britannia and
started Romanization which is not a very long time at all since the Iceni and other tribes
had many citizens who were alive for the event and remember what their lives were like
before the Romans arrived. They remembered their previous customs and a time when
each tribal king was not secondary to the Roman governor. But the Romans either did
not notice the growing tension or did not care, and Suetonius turned his attention to the
north in hopes of further expansion, leaving a hotbed of anti-Roman fervor unguarded
in the south. Boudicca’s genius was in taking advantage of this anger and uniting it
against a common enemy.
Boudicca was in a rare position at this point because, by 60 AD, she was the most
publicized case of the Briton with the least to lose. She had been unfairly brutalized by
the Romans only for attempting to adhere to Iceni customs of the king choosing his
successor upon death. And for this mistake, her daughters’ honor was spoiled, she
became bankrupt, family members were enslaved, and she was humiliated for all to see
by a very public flogging. We hear of no other cases in Britannia during this time period
such as hers where one woman has the unique position of both being well-known and
popular among her people and having endured so much simply for not assimilating
quickly enough. Her ability to unite the Trinovantes and the Iceni, raising an army
150,000 strong against their common enemy, was a great undertaking and stands as a
testament to her abilities. Even more so that she did this all while unbeknownst to the
Roman authority.
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Boudicca had just proved herself as a capable and charismatic leader, and she
soon after proved herself to be a smart and competent commander. Boudicca mainly
chose influential cities to attack; she chose cities that were indicative of Roman power
and authority. Camulodunum because it was taken from the Trinovantes and
Verulamium and Londinium as they were entirely new cities built by Rome to open
Britannia’s resources to the global market. While Londinium collapsed without putting
up much of a fight, since everyone who could fled with Suetonius, Camulodunum had a
small Roman presence and called in an entire legion as reinforcements. They both
proved to be no match for Boudicca and this legion was almost entirely destroyed. The
Romans had been continuously underestimating both the Britons’ and Boudicca’s
strength and capability and they were paying the price for it. Boudicca’s defeat of the IX
Legion near Camulodunum could not be seen as a fluke since she was less prepared for
that battle than she was for the Battle of Watling Street. The fight with the IX Legion
proved the military might of the Britons and their guerilla tactics. But unfortunately for
the Britons, arrogance led to their demise and after so many successes, they did not
take proper precautions and were defeated shortly after by Suetonius.
Had she won the Battle of Watling Street, it is conceivable that she could have
pushed the Romans out of Britannia, at least for some time. There would have been less
than two full legions left in the area with no current Roman governor and this, coupled
with Nero’s reluctance to have a presence there, could have been enough for a victory.
This story is important both because rebellions against the Roman Empire had a
tendency of failing, and the continued Romanization of Britannia was integral to the
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Britons much later emergence as a world power. Boudicca had successfully challenged
the power of the Roman Empire, going down in history as one of the few native peoples
to stand as a chance at ending Roman occupation. In addition, with all the anti-Roman
sentiments in Britannia, their use of this rebellion to instill loyalty in the region was a
necessity to keep it. A rebellion was inevitable, and if Rome did not change the Britons’
mindsets soon, there would be no conceivable end to the cycle. Through these actions,
they preserved Britannia for centuries and developed the region throughout their
occupation in a way that would prove to be important for the chance of Britannia of
having any effect on a global scale. Even though there is a large disconnect between the
Roman occupation of Britannia and the emergence of the British Empire, and it required
the work of several more centuries of different peoples coming and going, Rome had
begun the slow process of developing their future capabilities. They had given Britannia
a chance by pushing forward their growth as a civilization tremendously and gave them
some tools necessary to have any global influence.
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